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Abstract 
 
There is a lot of evidence that identity matters for behavior.  There is a widespread belief 
that societies will function better if they manage to establish a common sense of identity 
among the population and contemporary fears in many countries that this common 
identity is threatened.  This paper presents a simple framework for the determinants of 
identity and uses it to inform an empirical investigation of the correlates of national 
identity in Britain.  Our main conclusions are that people who feel they are treated with 
respect and who feel tolerated are the most likely to identify with feeling part of Britain. 
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Introduction 
There is considerable evidence that ‘identity matters’, that many individuals think of 
themselves as part of a social group and that this membership has consequences for 
individual behavior, for behavior towards others with the same identity and towards those 
who do not or are perceived not to share that identity.  How societies function is then 
likely to be affected by the number and type of social groups within it so the nature of 
identity becomes a matter of public concern.  Because there is very considerable evidence 
that people behave more pro-socially towards those they perceive as being of the same 
identity (starting perhaps with Tajfel, 1970) it is a common belief that countries should 
seek to create a sense of common identity among its citizens, what we might call ‘nation-
building’1.  This need is most acute in societies whose populations come from a diverse 
collection of cultures2.  In many countries, there are those who argue that there has been a 
serious failure in ‘nation-building’.  In the United States, Huntington (2004) expressed 
concern that Mexican immigrants are failing to adopt an American identity and the values 
that traditionally go with that.  In Britain – the focus of this study – a certain smug 
satisfaction that it had been relatively successful in building a multicultural society has 
turned to dismay as some young Britons turn suicide bombers.  The result has been an 
active debate about ‘Britishness’3. 
But, although there is a widespread belief that it is desirable to have a common 
sense of identity, there is much less agreement about how this is best achieved.  The 
‘multicultural’ approach suggests that minorities are more likely to feel part of a society 
if allowed or even encouraged to retain their traditional cultures.  However, others (e.g. 
Sen, 2006) have argued that such a policy only preserves differences and leads to 
fragmentation and a failure to build a sense of common identity.  But, in spite of the fact 
that many commentators have very strong views on the subject, we have remarkably little 
large-scale quantitative evidence on the factors associated with feeling a part of society.  
To present some evidence that sheds light on these questions is the purpose of this paper.   
                                                 
1 For example, Kymlicka (2002, p267) suggests “the common national identity provides a source of trust 
and solidarity that can accommodate deep disagreements over conceptions of the good life”. 
2 According to Putnam (2007, p137) “one of the most important challenges facing modern societies…. is 
the increase in ethnic and social heterogeneity in virtually all advanced societies”.  He also argues that a 
retreat to cultural homogeneity is not an option. 
3 To give but one example, see ex-Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s speech to the Fabian Society on the 
future of Britishness http://www.fabians.org.uk/events/speeches/the-future-of-britishness.  
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Our particular application in this paper is to Britain, though we believe the 
insights are of wider applicability.  Britain is a good country in which to investigate 
questions of identity because it contains a wide mix of ethnicities and cultures and 
because it has very good data on these topics, a product of the fact that the government 
has become very concerned about alleged failures in nation-building.  We use data from 
Britain’s 2007 Citizenship Survey to investigate the relationship between various 
measures of identity and other variables that have been thought related to these outcomes 
like ethnicity, religion, measures of integration, perceptions of fairness etc.   
It should be admitted from the outset that we do not have a clean research design 
with exogenous variation in the variables we include on the right-hand side of our 
regressions so that what we are estimating are correlations and not necessarily causal 
effects.  We will try to avoid interpreting our findings using language that smacks of 
causal effects though we may not always succeed in this to every readers’ satisfaction.  
Nevertheless we think our exercise is worthwhile.  Knowing what correlations are in the 
data does restrict the set of possible models to those that can explain that correlation.  
And it is important to remember that this is an area where many have very strongly-held 
views but there is little in the way of quantitative evidence of the sort we present.  In such 
a vacuum we believe that correlations can be of interest. 
 The plan of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we try to explain why a 
common sense of national identity has been regarded as important for the well-being of a 
society.  We then use the theoretical work on identity to develop hypotheses about the 
factors that might be associated with identity.  The second section describes our data and 
the third section considers the associations between identity and the factors identified as 
likely to be important.  Our main conclusions are that people who feel well treated are 
more likely to feel they belong to or identify with the wider society.  We also find little 
evidence that religious or ethnic minorities are either less likely to feel they belong or that 
they see an irresolvable conflict between their religion and identifying with Britain 
though many do experience some conflict at times. However the white British are more 
concerned about such conflict.  The fourth section concludes. 
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1. Identity 
Who Cares? 
There is now a considerable body of evidence from many parts of the social 
sciences that identity matters for behavior.  This is partly because the ‘rules’ for 
membership of a group generally require certain behavior from individuals, often to mark 
the individual as a member of the group.  Some of these prescribed behaviors may be 
regarded by others as undesirable even if the consequences fall wholly or largely on the 
individual (see, for example, Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005, on ‘acting white’ or 
Constant and Zimmermann, 2008, 2009, Casey and Dustmann, 2010, Nekby and Rodin, 
2010, Battu and Zenou, 2010, for links between identity and economic outcomes).   
But, identity also matters because it affects behavior towards others.  A general 
feature of groups (and one that is arguably essential for them to be stable) is that one 
behaves in a more pro-social way towards other members of the same group and less pro-
socially to outsiders (in some cases, it may be that a group actively causes harm to 
outsiders) - see Hogg and Vaughan (2005) for an accessible introduction to this literature 
or Bernhard et al. (2006), Goette at al. (2006), and Charness et al. (2007) for recent 
examples from the economics literature.  Essentially one puts a greater weight on the 
welfare of someone who is part of one’s group than one does on the welfare of an 
outsider. 
From this perspective, it is easy to understand why it is widely believed that it is 
desirable for those in a country to have a common sense of national identity.  To give an 
example, suppose a society consists of two groups who do not care about each other – a 
majority and a minority who differ in their preferences in some way.  If decisions are 
made by majority vote, there is a danger that the majority will enact policies that are very 
disadvantageous to the minority – John Stuart Mills’ ‘tyranny of the majority’.  In turn, 
the minority may then, realizing the impossibility of achieving more desirable outcomes 
peacefully through the ballot box, resort to violence or the threat of it in an attempt to get 
the majority to take its grievances seriously. 
If, by creating a common sense of national identity, both groups think of the other 
as part of a wider in-group, then the effective distance in preferences will be reduced and 
less extreme outcomes will be produced.  Although the minority does not have political 
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power, the majority will, in part, internalize the welfare of the minority, so that the 
policies enacted will be less harmful to the minority.  And, because the minority now 
internalize, in part, the welfare of the majority they will be less likely to threaten harm to 
obtain a more desirable outcome.   
We do have evidence of costs from diversity that is usefully surveyed by Alesina 
and La Ferrara (2005).  They review evidence like that presented by Easterly and Levine 
(1997) that ethnic fragmentation leads to lower growth in Africa and Alesina, Baqir and 
Easterly (1999) that public good provision is lower in US cities with higher levels of 
ethnic diversity.  Miguel (2004) argues, in a comparison between Kenya and Tanzania, 
that nation-building does help foster cohesive societies.  Alesina and La Ferrara (2005, 
p794) conclude that there is “overwhelming evidence” that public good provision is 
lower in fragmented societies”.  We do have some studies providing evidence against this 
i.e. that diversity raises productivity (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006) and encourages 
innovation (Ozgen, Nijkamp and Poot, 2011a, b) though also studies that ethnic conflict 
can raise job separations (Miaari, Zussman and Zussman, 2012) 
Fostering a common sense of national identity is designed to reduce such 
fragmentation – political philosophers sometimes express this nicely as trying to align the 
boundaries of ethical communities with those of political communities4.  But, even once 
one has accepted the desirability of ‘nation-building’, one has to try to understand what 
factors are likely to be associated with a common sense of identity.  For that, one needs a 
theory of why people choose the identities they do.   
 
Hypotheses 
Theories of ‘identity’ are very much in their infancy and we make no pretence here to do 
more than sketch factors that might be thought to be important.  We structure our 
discussion around the framework proposed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) but similar 
ideas are contained in, inter alia, Bernheim (1994), Akerlof (1997), Glaeser and 
Scheinkman (2001) or Shayo (2009).   
                                                 
4 Though the empirical evidence supporting this view is not all strong e.g. Masella (2012) finds no evidence 
of lower levels of national identity in fragmented societies. 
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 In Akerlof and Kranton (2000) individuals are assumed to have a utility function 
that is in part conventional and in part depends on the strength or weakness of their 
identity which is assumed to have a positive effect on utility.  The conventional part of 
the utility function depends on the individual’s actions and the actions of others – for our 
purposes, we can ignore these latter factors.  Assume that individuals have to make a 
decision, 
ix  – this could be multi-dimensional but to convey the basic ideas we will write 
as if it is one-dimensional.  There is a value of ix , ix  which is the optimal value for 
individual i according to the conventional part of their utility function  – this will be 
affected by the individual’s tastes which themselves might be influenced by, for example, 
the culture of their parents.  We assume there is a quadratic loss function  
21
2
i i ic x x   
for deviations of actual behavior from the individual optimum.  The parameter ic  can be 
thought of as a measure of how flexible an individual is or how strongly they adhere to 
their original values. 
 Now consider the ‘identity’ part of the utility function.  Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000) assume this depends on own and others’ actions and how closely one’s actions 
conform to those prescribed by members of the group.  We compress this by assuming 
that others’ actions towards the individual depend on the extent of deviation between ix  
and the group’s optimal desired behavior, *gx .  We assume the group offers identity level 
gB  if one conforms fully and reduces benefits as behavior deviates from this according to 
a quadratic loss function with parameter gb .  The parameter gb  can be thought of as a 
measure of how tolerant or inclusive a group is.  So the identity part of the utility function 
can be written as  
2
*1
2
g g i gB b x x   
 Putting this together, the overall utility for individual i if they and take action ix   
can be written as: 
      
22 *1 1,
2 2
i i i i i g g i gU x g c x x B b x x       (1) 
Individuals are assumed to choose the action ix  to maximize this utility function which 
leads to the following decision rule:  
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*
i i g g
i
i g
c x b x
x
c b



 (2) 
so that the optimal action is a weighted average of the individual and group optima with 
the weight on the individual optimum being larger the less flexible is the individual and 
the more tolerant is the group.  The value of the identity component of the utility function 
at the optimal choice is given by:  
   
 
 
2
2
*
2
1
2
i g
i g i g
i g
c b
I B x x
c b
  

    (3) 
We will interpret this as a measure of the individual’s strength of identification with 
group g.  This will be a subjective feeling of the individual – it may not correspond with 
whether they are seen by others as a member of the group (and some of our results below 
do suggest differences in opinion).  The level of identification will be lower the larger the 
gap between individual and group optima *
i gx x and the less flexible is the individual 
i.e. a higher ic .  The larger the group benefits gB the stronger is the identification to the 
group.   The effect of the toleration parameter gb is more subtle.  For a given action a 
more tolerant group will create a greater sense of identification.  But the action will 
respond to more toleration by moving towards the individual optimum and this reduces 
the level of identification.  With the functional forms used here, the level of identification 
first decreases and then increases in the level of  gb  before eventually becoming flat as 
the group heads towards total intolerance. 
 In this set-up the level of an individual’s identification with a group depends 
partly on their individual characteristics – here  ,i ic x - but also on how they perceive 
they will be treated by the other members of that group – here captured by the parameters 
 *, ,g g iB b x .  Although this is a model that assumes an individual can do something to 
influence their level of identification with a group, it is capable of capturing the idea that 
it may be impossible for some individuals to identify with some groups.  For example if 
having a white skin is regarded as a requirement for having a particular identity by those 
who are white, this identity is effectively unavailable to ethnic minorities – in this case 
one might think of skin colour as the x , that whites do not tolerate any deviations from 
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‘whiteness’ i.e. gb is very high and that the costs of making one’s skin white for a non-
white individual are also very high i.e. ic  is very high.  In this case one can think of the 
extent of identification of non-whites with the white group as being very low. 
 Although this is a very simple set-up, we think it can provide insights into debates 
about individuals’ identity.  To give one example, consider Muslims.  One view of Islam 
(e.g. that proposed by Huntington, 2002) – though not one, it will turn out, that is 
particularly supported by the empirical evidence we present below - is that it has norms 
about behavior that are very different from those prevalent among the populations of 
liberal democracies (i.e. *
i gx x  is high), and of being intolerant of deviations from these 
norms so that gb  is high.  In this case, Muslims in liberal democracies are likely to have a 
low level of national identity. 
 The simplicity of the set-up is appealing but does raise some questions that the 
original formulation in Akerlof and Kranton (2000) did not really answer.  First, it is 
unclear about where the norms of behavior come from and who determines them.  In 
reality the groups in society are not – as they are modeled - clubs (Buchanan, 1965) with 
a clearly defined membership, rules ones has to obey if one is a member, club benefits if 
one obeys the rules and sanctions if one does not.  In reality membership is not clearly 
defined and ‘members’ will have different views about what is appropriate behavior to be 
a member of the group.  The identity component of the utility function described above 
should really be thought of as an expected utility derived from the interactions with 
others who may clearly or ambiguously be members of the group.  It is possible that this 
fuzziness in membership and norms is so great that the whole notion of identity is 
unhelpful and it would be better to think of people as simply taking actions which then 
influence how others behave towards them and this then determines utility.  But the 
literature on ‘identity’ is predicated on it being a useful concept and individuals do seem 
to be able to think of themselves in that way (for example, they answer identity questions 
in surveys).   
 Because of the fuzziness there is likely to be differences in opinion about 
appropriate norms and behaviors and who belongs to which group. If these differences of 
opinion are aired in public, these norms are likely to change over time.  That process of 
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change is a fascinating one but beyond the scope of the present paper.  Bisin and Verdier 
(2000), Bisin, Topa and Verdier (2004) and Tabellini (2008) seek to explain the norms by 
presenting models in which the preferences of individuals are moulded by their parents, 
while the norms of group behavior are likely to be influenced by those who are members 
of the group (see Patacchini and Zenou, 2009, for an example of this approach).   
 The discussion so far has assumed there is a single group to which individuals can 
be attached strongly or weakly.  But, as Berry (1997) and Sen (2006) have emphasized, 
there are many groups in societies and individuals typically have varying degrees of 
identification with many of them.  If the groups have the same norms, there is no conflict 
in identifying equally strongly with different groups but if there are different norms then 
there is a trade-off – an individual has to decide with which of the groups to identify most 
strongly.  
 This section has presented a simple model for the determination of the strength of 
identification of an individual with a group.  We now turn to our application to the 
strength of identification with Britain. 
 
2. Data 
Our empirical application is to Britain (actually, only England and Wales).  
However, we feel that the questions about identity are not unique to Britain so that our 
results are likely to be of more general applicability.  Britain is an interesting country to 
study because it now has a population which is very diverse in both ethnicity and religion 
and events like the 2005 London bombings have shocked many people into thinking that 
there is a crisis in nation-building.  Britain also has the advantage that, as a result of these 
concerns, it collects good data on identity and related issues.  The data we use in this 
paper comes from England and Wales’ 2007 Citizenship Survey (CS) administered by the 
Department for Communities and Local Government5.  This survey has been conducted 
(though under varying names) every two years since 2001.  The sample is approximately 
10,000 adults in England and Wales with an additional boost sample of 5,000 adults from 
minority ethnic groups which allows a large enough sample from those groups for 
                                                 
5 See http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/racecohesionfaith/research/citizenshipsurvey/ for more 
details. 
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statistical analysis.  The survey asks questions about a wide range of issues, including 
race equality, faith, feelings about their community, identity, and various measures of 
social capital. The richness of this data set allows us to investigate the correlates of 
identity much more extensively than previous research.  For example, Manning and Roy 
(2010) use the UK Labour Force Survey to investigate the correlates of national identity 
but that survey only contains demographics like age, education and gender as well as 
immigrant status, ethnicity and religion.  This paper investigates broader forms of identity 
than national identity and has a much richer menu of variables to include in the 
regressions. 
Historical Background 
It might be useful to give a brief background on British policy towards the assimilation 
and/or integration of immigrants.  Large-scale immigration into the UK started in the 
1950s and by the 1960s there was an active discussion about the appropriate policy 
response.  What emerged as the dominant idea is well-summarized by the following 
quotation from the Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in 1966: “I do not regard [integration] as 
meaning the loss, by immigrants, of their own national characteristics and culture. I do 
not think that we need in this country a ‘melting pot’, which will turn everybody out in a 
common mould, as one of a series of carbon copies of someone’s misplaced vision of the 
stereotyped Englishman… I define integration, therefore, not as a flattening process of 
assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an 
atmosphere of mutual tolerance”.  This led to the early (by European standards) 
legislation against discrimination (the first law being the 1965 Race relations Act)  and a 
generally sympathetic attitude to allowing cultural and religious exemptions to laws and 
practices e.g. allowing Sikh motorcyclists to wear turbans instead of helmets and Muslim 
policewomen to wear the hijab on duty. There was a belief that if natives were hospitable 
to immigrants, the minorities would, in return, come to feel part of the wider community 
– just one big happy family. The reality was often far from this rosy picture – there were 
riots in many British cities in the early 1980s and various organizations, notably the 
police, have been widely criticized for institutional racism. But more recently there has 
been a feeling that this strategy of multiculturalism has failed to create a common core of 
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values, primarily because it offered minorities more than it asked from them in return and 
that some communities chose not to integrate into the wider society. Events like the 
London bombings of 2005 have shocked people into thinking something has gone badly 
wrong.  For example, the chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality (the 
government body charged with fighting discrimination) argued in a TV interview that 
multiculturalism was leading to segregation, saying that “too many public authorities 
particularly [are] taking diversity to a point where they [are] saying, ‘actually we're going 
to reward you for being different, we are going to give you a community centre only if 
you are Pakistani or African Caribbean and so on, but we're not going to encourage you 
to be part of the community of our town’. The reaction has included not just a wringing 
of hands but also substantive changes to policy – immigrants becoming citizens now have 
to pass a test on language, culture and history designed to mould their values into those 
deemed appropriate (though how effective are these tests has been questioned).   
 
Sub-Samples 
In most of the analysis we focus on 3 sub-samples though not all of the outcome variables 
are relevant for all of them.  The first sub-sample is the UK-born who describe their 
ethnicity as ‘white British’.  This is obviously the largest group in the population as a 
whole but, because the CS over-samples ethnic minorities they are under-represented in 
our analysis sample.  Although it might be taken for granted that all of this group feels 
British and they virtually all do report a British national identity, we shall see that a 
sizeable minority report they do not feel a part of Britain and understanding why is of 
considerable interest. 
 Our second sub-sample is non-white first-generation immigrants i.e. those born 
abroad.  These are of obvious interest because they will have come from cultures that 
may be different from British norms and their integration into British society is seen as an 
important matter of public concern.  Our third sub-sample is the non-white British born – 
for the most part these will be the children of the second sub-sample.  They are of 
particular interest because of fears that they adhere more closely to the culture of the 
countries from which their parents originated than to British values (see, for example, 
Algan and Cahuc, 2010, Fernandez and Fogli, 2009, for evidence pertinent to this).  For 
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the non-white ethnic groups we reduce the 13 categories in the original survey to 8 – 
Mixed, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean, Black African, Chinese and 
Other.  This is because sample sizes are very small for some of the other groups. 
This way of dividing the sample does exclude white immigrants and the white 
UK-born who do not describe their ethnicity as ‘white British’.   We exclude them 
because they are a small part of the sample (under 5% - as there is no explicit boost 
sample for them) and because they are a very heterogeneous group comprising, for 
example, those of Irish origin (who we know from other work are very reluctant to adopt 
a British identity – see Manning and Roy, 2010), recent Eastern European immigrants 
and some Middle Eastern immigrants.  Any inference about the outcomes for these 
groups are unreliable so we think it best to say nothing about them.  Table 1 presents the 
proportions of the three sub-samples in our data and the weighted proportions (the 
weights being intended to reproduce the UK population as a whole). 
 Table 1 also presents some basic demographics.  The white natives are older, on 
average than the immigrants who in turn are older than the UK-born minorities.  The 
gender mix is similar.  In terms of education both of the non-white sub-samples are more 
likely to have a degree but the immigrants are also more likely to have only foreign or no 
qualifications (see table A.1 in the Appendix for details of the education coding).  The 
ethnic mix of the foreign- and UK-born minorities is also different – the UK-born have 
more Black Caribbeans and more of mixed race (who are mostly a Black-White mix).  
Recent immigrant groups like the Bangladeshis and Black Africans are under-represented 
in the UK born.  In terms of religion 80% of the white natives report being Christian with 
17% reporting no religion and very small numbers other religions.  The minority sub-
samples are more likely to have some religion but are also different in their type of 
religion – there are as many Muslims as Christians.   
 
Identity Variables 
The CS asks a number of questions about national identity and sense of belonging.  First, 
there is a question “what do you consider your national identity to be?” Respondents can 
report multiple national identities.  Here we restrict attention to those who report a British 
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identity (which means at least one of British, English, Scottish or Welsh) – we denote this 
variable by BRITID6.  Table 2 shows that almost all white natives report a British identity 
so it is not interesting to analyse answers to this question for this group.  For non-white 
natives, the reported levels of British identity are lower but still very high at 95%, 
perhaps higher than many might expect.  For non-white immigrants reported levels of 
British identity are lower – 58%.  These findings are in line with those reported using 
Labour Force Survey data in Manning and Roy (2010).  One problem with this outcome 
variable is that it may be interpreted in a very legalistic way so that one reports a British 
identity if one holds a British passport (Manning and Roy, 2010 show that, for 
immigrants, citizenship is very strongly though not perfectly associated with reporting a 
British identity).  In terms of the theoretical framework sketched above, many 
respondents may consider the criterion for having a British national identity to be ‘I have 
a British passport’.  For this reason we also analyse other questions asked in the CS that 
relate to more subjective feelings of identity and belonging. 
First, there is a question “to what extent do you agree or disagree that you 
personally feel a part of British society?” - FEELBRIT.  This is a 4-point scale with 0 
representing ‘strongly disagree’ and 1 ‘strongly agree’.  The distribution of responses and 
mean response for our sub-samples are reported in Table 2. As one can see there are 
similar levels of responses for all three sub-samples which might indicate that the UK has 
done a good job in making immigrants and their children feel a part of British society or 
that it has succeeded in alienating a non-trivial portion of the native white section.  But, 
just because there are similar overall levels reported for the three sub-samples does not 
mean the factors associated with feeling part of society are the same and we shall see they 
are not.   
There is also a question on ‘How strongly do you feel you belong to Britain?’, - 
BELONGBRIT - a 4-point scale with 0 representing ‘not at all strongly’ and 1 ‘very 
                                                 
6 It is an interesting and important question to consider how the recent devolution of political power to 
Scotland and Wales affects sub-national identities in the UK.  But this is not our main focus of interest here 
so we ignore it. 
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strongly’.  Table 2 again shows similar levels of sense of belonging among the 3 sub-
samples.  This is correlated with FEELBRIT but the level of correlation is low. 
Finally, it is interesting to compare this with the sense of belonging to the 
neighbourhood and the local area with responses to the question on ‘How strongly do you 
feel you belong to your immediate neighbourhood?’, - BELONGNEIGH –and ‘How 
strongly do you feel you belong to your local area?’-BELONGLOC. If individuals’ 
experience of a country is through their local community then we might expect belonging 
to a neighbourhood and a country to be strongly related.  But it may be that the sense of 
belonging to a country comes through national information e.g. the media. Both local 
identity variables are coded on a  4-point scale with 0 representing ‘not at all strongly’ 
and 1 ‘very strongly’.  Again, all 3 sub-samples show remarkably similar levels in these 
variables. 
 All of these variables relate to the individual’s sense of their own identity.  But it 
is equally, if not more important, to consider the perception of your identity by others.  
We may well think it a problem if whites do not think of non-whites as British even if the 
non-whites themselves do.  The CS has a number of questions which help us to get at 
this.  First there a is a question –DUALID -“How much do you agree or disagree that it is 
possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural and religious 
identity?”coded on a 4-point scale where 0 is “strongly disagree” and 1 is “strongly 
agree”.  Here we do see differences between the sub-samples, the non-whites are much 
less likely than the whites to see a potential conflict.  There is a certain ambiguity in 
interpretation but it does not seem likely that the whites think there is a conflict between 
their religious and cultural identity and feeling British – rather they are almost certainly 
referring to the religious and cultural identities of ‘others’.  Here we can see some 
differences across sub-samples – whites are more likely than non-whites to perceive a 
possible conflict.  There is also a question FECONF on ‘whether the respondent ever 
feels a conflict between religion and national identity’ – a five-point scale with 0 being 
never and 1 all the time.  Non-whites report more personal conflict than whites though 
less than 10% of non-whites report experiencing a conflict most or all of the time. 
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Independent Variables 
The identity variables will be the dependent variables in the regressions we estimate in 
this paper.  On the right-hand side of the regressions we include the usual demographics -
gender, age, education, and region.  Age may have an effect either because attitudes 
change over a lifetime or because they change from generation to generation.  Education 
may have an effect because it is has been argued to affect citizenship (see, for example, 
Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos, 2004).  But we are particularly interested in variables 
that others in the literature or public debate have hypothesized to be important for 
national identity.  The factors we consider are: 
- ethnicity 
- religion 
- English language proficiency 
- mixing 
- discrimination 
- economic situation   
Descriptive statistics on these variables are reported in Table 3.  In describing these 
variables in more detail we use the conceptual framework described earlier to explain 
why these variables might be expected to be correlated with identity.  For most of these 
variables we use a composite index, the composition of which is described in a web 
Appendix. 
 
Ethnicity 
A central part of debates about national identity in Britain has been about whether ethnic 
minorities feel a part of Britain.  There are a number of reasons why they might be less 
likely than whites to feel a part of Britain.  First, it is very likely that non-whites are the 
children of immigrants so (following research like Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Fernandez 
and Fogli, 2009) may have cultural values different from the white majority (though see 
Hatton and Leigh, 2011, for evidence that behavior of whole communities changes over 
time) – in terms of our model this would correspond to a high value of *i gx x .  But, it 
could also be that non-whites might say they do not feel British because they do not feel 
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accepted by the white majority part of society so perceive the group benefits gB  to be 
low or the white majority as intolerant of deviations from white norms – a high value of 
gb .  It is also conceivable that some or all of these groups are not very flexible i.e. they 
have a low value of ic . 
We include variables that relate to self-described ethnicity and also variables 
which can be thought of measuring the intensity of ethnic identification (see Constant, 
Gataullina and Zimmermann (2008) for other ways of doing this).  The strength of ethnic 
identification could be interpreted as being about how much one is attached to the culture 
of one’s forebears i.e. to the value of ic .  The CS contains two measures of the strength 
of ethnic identification – there is a question which asks ‘how important is your ethnic 
background to your sense of who you are” (IMPETH) and a variable (IMPFO) which 
asks a similar question about the country from which the family came originally. Table 3 
shows the average values of these variables for our 3 sub-samples – both of the non-white 
sub-samples attach more importance to ethnicity with similar level of importance of 
ethnicity between UK-born and immigrants but with higher importance of family origin 
for immigrants.  However, white natives do show quite high levels of both of these 
variables. 
 
Religion 
Most, if not all religions, mandate certain behaviors on the part of its adherents and 
encourage parents to transmit these values to their children i.e. encourages them to be 
inflexible (a high ic ).  This will then act to reduce the benefits of membership of any 
group with norms of behavior very different from that of the religion i.e. a high value of 
*
i gx x .  Although all religions probably contain some element of this, it is possible that 
it is more relevant for some religions than others.  For example, a key part of radical 
Islamist ideas is that the first (and perhaps only) loyalty of Muslims should be towards 
Muslims of any nationality – the ‘umma’.  If these views are widely held we might 
expect to see low levels of British identity among Muslims.  This is one reason to control 
for religious affiliation – the categories being Christian, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Other and 
None.  We also have some controls that measure the intensity of religious devotion – 
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whether the religion is being actively practiced, the importance of religion to one’s sense 
of identity, and the importance of religion for where you live, where you work, who your 
friends are and what school you send your children to.  We combine all of these measures 
into a single measure – IMPORTREL – which measures the importance of religion to the 
individual.  Table 3 shows that religion is least important to the white natives and most 
important for the non-white immigrants.  There are significant differences in the 
importance of religion across religions – it is most important to Muslims (in line with the 
findings of Bisin et al, 20087) but there is not a clean division between them and others – 
Sikhs and Hindus lie between the Muslims and Christians in the importance of religion. 
 
Language Proficiency 
It is commonly argued that language proficiency is critical in enabling people to be full 
citizens.  Policy changes in the UK in recent years have been directed towards ensuring 
that immigrants are sufficiently proficient to be able to hold down a job and mix with 
those outside their culture.  In terms of the model developed above, one could argue that 
having a common language means people are more likely to care about the same things 
so that norms of behavior are more likely to be similar i.e. the value of *
i gx x  will be 
reduced.    
The CS contains a number of variables relating to proficiency in English.  We 
combine four such measures - whether English is the main language spoken at home, and 
the self-assessed levels of proficiency in speaking, reading and writing into a single 
composite measure ELANG8.  As one would expect English proficiency is highest for 
white natives, followed by non-white natives and non-white immigrants.  It is worth 
noting that very few non-white natives report any problem with English so, as one might 
expect, all language problems affect only the first generation.  In this context it is worth 
noting that there has been little or no dissent in the UK from the view that all education 
                                                 
7 Though see Arai, Karlsson and Lundholm (2011) for a sceptical view on many of the other results in this 
paper. 
8 Unfortunately  it is the respondents who assess their own language ability (it would be better to have some 
test scores) and the routing of the questions does not ask about proficiency for those who speak English at 
home (and we assume they are proficient) even though there are, for example, well-known literacy 
problems among segments of the white native population. 
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should be in English so bilingualism is not the issue it is in some other countries (see, for 
example, Aspachs-Bracons et al 2008a,b, or Angrist et al, 2008) 
 
Mixing 
Fears are often expressed about how much mixing there is between cultures in Britain – it 
is argued that some groups mix very little outside their own ethnic group and that this 
hinders their participation in British society.  There is a large literature on how attitudes 
towards ethnic and religious groups that differ from your own are affected by contact 
with those groups – Putnam (2007) provides an excellent discussion.  Put simply, the 
‘contact’ hypothesis suggests that mixing makes one more favorably inclined to other 
groups, but the ‘conflict’ hypothesis suggests that it simply brings conflict into the open.  
The ‘contact’ hypothesis could be interpreted as predicting that people will become more 
tolerant of the difference of others, i.e. mixing acts to lower gb , that it makes people 
more similar in terms of norms i.e. it lowers *
i gx x , or that it makes individuals more 
flexible i.e. it lowers ic .  On the other hand, the ’conflict’ hypothesis might suggest that 
groups become less tolerant of diversity when there is competition among groups as they 
need to work harder to preserve their advantages.  
The CS contains a number of variables related to this.  First, there is a measure of 
the proportion of non-whites in the ward in which the respondent lives (PETHWARD) – 
this is only recorded as deciles across wards.  This is hard data from the 2000 Census.  As 
can be seen from Table 3, the non-white sub-samples are more likely to live in wards 
with many non-whites. The UK-born minorities are only marginally less segregated 
residentially than the immigrants.  
 Secondly there is a variable about perceptions of the ethnic mix in the local area 
(ETHAREA).  This is a 4-point scale taking the value 0 if everyone is the same ethnicity 
as the respondent and 1 if less than half are the same ethnicity.   Whites are more likely to 
live in an area with lots of the same ethnicity as one would expect.  
 These variables might be expected to reflect the opportunities for mixing but there 
are also some more direct questions about mixing.  There are questions about the 
proportion of friends of the same ethnicity, and how often one mixes with people of a 
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different ethnicity in various environments9.  The variable MIXING is a composite 
extracted from ten variables (see table A.7 in the Appendix for details).  Table 3 shows 
that white natives are least likely to have friends of a different ethnicity (perhaps not 
surprising given the proportions in the population) but that there is more mixing for non-
white natives than non-white immigrants.  In interpreting results using this variable it is 
important whether one thinks of the mixing as unavoidable or a choice.  The mixing 
questions ask about some domains e.g. shops where mixing is probably unavoidable if 
you live in an ethnically diverse community, but other domains e.g. the home where one 
has total control.  Mixing across different domains is strongly correlated so we prefer to 
think as this being a variable affected primarily by the nature of the local community 
rather than a choice variable of the individual. 
  
Discrimination 
We have emphasized that whether one feels part of a group is likely to be affected by 
how one thinks one is treated by that group.  If one thinks one is treated badly or unfairly 
then it is plausible to believe one is less likely to feel part of the group or choose that 
identity.  In terms of the conceptual framework this is because the perceived benefits 
from group membership are low and/or the group is intolerant of any deviation from the 
ideal norms (a high gb ).  Hence, perceptions and experience of discrimination might be 
expected to be important and the CS contains a number of questions on this topic.   
 We include three composite variables.  The first, GOVDISCRIM, is a composite 
variable derived from the responses to questions on whether the respondent thinks one is 
treated worse, better or the same as people of other races by 15 public-sector organization 
from doctors, local councils through to the criminal justice system.  Table 3 shows that 
non-whites are more likely than whites to think they will be treated worse but it is non-
white natives who perceive this most.  But, it is also worth noting that white natives also 
show a level of perceived discrimination not massively lower than non-white 
immigrants10. 
                                                 
9 There are also more specific questions about the ethnicity of close friends but large numbers of missing 
values limit the usefulness of these questions. 
10 It is perhaps worth noting that there are differences across ethnic groups in the organizations perceived to 
treat them worse – blacks are especially likely to single out the police and criminal justice system, whites 
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The variable discussed above is about discrimination experienced or perceived by 
public-sector bodies.  But it is also quite likely that how one is treated by other people in 
everyday interactions is important in influencing values.  To capture this we use a 
variable, RESPECT, which is a composite variable constructed from responses to 
questions about whether one feels treated with respect in 4 settings.  Table 3 shows 
generally high levels of respect but slightly higher among immigrants than both native 
sub-samples.  It is important to note that these variables refer to perceptions of 
discrimination – it may be, for example, that expectations of treatment are lower for 
foreign-born as opposed to UK-born non-whites rather than the actual incidence of 
discrimination.  And there are dangers of reverse causality here as with many other 
variables – if one does not feel a part of society one may be more inclined to perceive 
discrimination.  
 The two variables related to discrimination discussed so far have both been about 
how any discrimination affects one’s personal experiences.  But it may also be the case 
that perceptions of general discrimination (even if not directed towards the self) are also 
associated with particular identities.  For example, if one cares about fairness then a 
belief in discrimination against some other group might make one less likely to identify 
with that group.  So we construct a variable, GENDISCRIM, from responses to questions 
about the general level of discrimination in British society.  The responses to these 
questions are, unsurprisingly, correlated with the personal experiences but not perfectly.  
This can be seen from Table 3 where whites report similar levels of general 
discrimination to non-white natives – perhaps interestingly it is the non-white immigrants 
who report the lowest levels of discrimination in British society. 
 
Economic Situation 
It is sometimes argued that economic disadvantage (whether from discrimination or other 
causes) is a powerful source of disillusion.  In terms of the framework sketched above, 
suppose that economic success is a norm valued by some groups and that groups benefits 
                                                                                                                                                 
the housing authorities and local councils.  Asians report discrimination fairly evenly spread across 
organizations. 
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are less for those who are not economically successful.  The poorer will perceive lower 
levels of benefit from group’s membership in this case. 
We include a variable, INCOME, which is a composite measure of the economic 
situation of the respondent and includes among other variables an index of deprivation of 
the area one lives11 (see table A.6 in the Appendix ).  Table 3 shows that, as expected, 
whites have higher levels of economic well-being than non-whites.  Non-whites are more 
likely to live in deprived neighbourhoods. 
 
Pro-Sociality 
In the framework we have sketched, identity is likely to be affected by the behavior of 
others with whom one comes into contact as how one is treated by them affects perceived 
group benefits, gB .  Accordingly we construct a variable, NEIGHPROSOC, to capture 
measures of pro-sociality in the neighbourhood using questions on vandalism, safety and 
neighbourhood cohesion.  Table 3 shows the lowest levels for non-white natives.  For 
completeness we also investigate the association of identity with a composite indicator of 
own pro-social behavior - we construct a measure, PROSOCIAL, derived from questions 
on volunteering, civic activity and charitable donations.  Table 3 shows similar levels of 
pro-sociality for the two native sub-samples and a somewhat lower level for immigrants.   
  
3. Results 
We now turn to our analysis of the associations between the variables described 
above and the variables we treat as outcomes.  We reiterate once more that these are 
correlations not causal effects and will try to be careful in interpreting the associations we 
find.  One other general point of warning – it is tempting when looking over the results to 
be drawn to those coefficients that are significantly different from zero.  But statistical 
significance is also influenced by sample size and, for a given sample, (loosely) by the 
variance of the variable.  So more variables will tend to be significant in the white native 
sample than the non-white samples because the sample size is larger.  And the ‘Muslim’ 
dummy will tend to be more significant than the ‘Sikh’ dummy because the proportion of 
                                                 
11 See http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/neighbourhoodrenewal/deprivation/deprivation07/ for 
details of how this is computed. 
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Muslims is higher than that of Sikhs.  So, one needs to look at the size of coefficients as 
well as their significance.  Apart from national identity, the ‘identity’ variables are Likert 
scales that we convert to a 0-1 scale for ease of interpretation.  In the regressions that 
follow we estimate linear models though none of the substantive conclusions are altered 
by using other statistical methods to take account of the categorical nature of the data 
used.  Also, we estimate our equations one at a time but one should recognize that the 
‘identity’ variables are not independent of each other.  Again, other statistical methods 
lead to similar conclusions.  In all the results that follow we report the R-squared – these 
are typically very low indicating either a lot of individual heterogeneity or some 
important omitted factors.  It is perhaps unsurprising given the difficulties in getting good 
measures of the key concepts.  
In what follows, there are a large number of variables in a large number of 
regressions and we are conscious that this makes the results hard to digest.  This 
difficulty is compounded by the fact that many variables are generally insignificant so 
that no consistent pattern other than their insignificance is readily extracted from the data.  
Given this, one might reasonably ask why include these variables at all.  We have 
decided to retain them because these are often variables e.g. religious affiliation, that are 
widely believed to be strongly associated with values and that omitting them would lead 
to the question ‘why not include variable x’.  Our analysis is then useful because it shows 
that many commonly-held opinions are not supported by the data. 
To try to facilitate digestion of the results, our approach is the following.  We 
discuss which variables seem to have similar effects for our three sub-samples and then 
which have different effects.  We then offer an interpretation in terms of the theoretical 
framework we set out previously. 
In the final row of each regression we also report an estimate of the dependent 
variable using a reference individual that is the same for all three sub-samples except for 
ethnicity which must differ for the whites and non-whites.  For the non-whites our 
reference person is an Indian though ethnicity effects turn out to often be rather small so 
our results are not very sensitive to that choice.   
Let us now consider the association of these questions with the independent 
variables discussed earlier.  Results for BRITID are reported in table 4, for FEELBRIT 
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and BELONGBRIT in table 5, for BELONGNEIGH and BELONGLOC in Table 6, and 
DUALID and FECONF in Table 7.  For BRITID – having a British national identity – we 
do not report results for white natives as 99% of them report a British national identity.  
For foreign born non-whites the marginal effects from a probit equation are reported in 
the first column of Table 4 – for UK-born non-whites the marginal effects are reported in 
the second column.   
For the foreign-born non-whites, the variables that are significantly associated 
with reporting a British national identity are the following: First, recent immigrants are 
less likely to report a British national identity, as are those whose English proficiency is 
weak.  There is some variation across ethnic groups with Black Africans, Chinese, other 
and mixed ethnicities being significantly less likely to report a British national identity 
than the omitted category of Indians – Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are more likely to 
report a British national identity though the difference is not significant.  Stronger 
identity with the country of origin is associated with being less likely to report a British 
national identity.  Religion is not very important, a finding in line with Manning and Roy 
(2010).  Immigrants perceiving that they live in areas with a higher proportion of other 
ethnicities are less likely to report a British national identity. Quite a lot of variables have 
estimated marginal effects that are not significantly different from zero.   
The marginal effects for British-born non-whites are reported in the second 
column.  These effects are all a lot smaller in magnitude than those for the foreign-born 
because of the differences in the mean of the dependent variable – 58% of the foreign-
born report a British national identity compared to 95% of the British-born.  For UK-born 
minorities, those with a strong ethnic identity are less likely to report a British national 
identity but those who live in areas with a higher proportion of ethnic minorities are more 
likely to.  The ethnicity effects are different from those seen in the immigrants but none 
of them are significantly different from zero.   
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these findings is that religious affiliation is 
not significantly associated with lower levels of national identity though religiosity is. 
There is widespread concern that radical Islam is pushing the idea that Muslims should 
feel a common identity with fellow Muslims elsewhere in the world – the ‘umma’ - and 
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not with non-Muslims in their own country12.  In fact 4 out of 1783 Muslim respondents 
did take advantage of the open-ended nature of the national identity question to list their 
identity as ‘Muslim’.  These views do exist, and have the potential to cause problems out 
of proportion to their numbers, but are rare - most people think of religion and national 
identity as separate categories.   
Another set of variables that are perhaps not as significant as one might have 
expected relate to the proportion of non-whites in the ward, the perception of ethnic 
diversity and the extent of personal mixing.  There are some significant correlations here 
– but the pattern is mixed.  
The dependent variable of Table 4 – whether one reports a British national 
identity – has the potential problem that it might be interpreted by many respondents in a 
very legalistic way – e.g. Manning and Roy (2010) showed that being a UK citizen (a 
variable not in our data set here) was very strongly correlated with national identity.  
Table 5 turns attention to two other variables that are less likely to produce a legalistic 
response – FEELBRIT and BELONGBRIT.  These two questions are similar in many 
respects and the pattern of responses are also similar so we will discuss them jointly, 
pointing out any important differences.  We first describe the main results and then offer 
an interpretation. 
First, there are some factors that have strong associations with the sense of 
belonging for all three of our sub-samples.  Perhaps the most striking is that those who 
feel treated with respect, that they are not discriminated against and that British society is 
not discriminatory, are much more likely to report that they feel they belong.  This simply 
suggests that people are more likely to feel alienated if they feel they are treated badly.  
There is also some suggestion that individuals who are more pro-social or live in pro-
social neighbourhoods and (less strongly) who mix more are more likely to feel they 
belong though these effects are not always significant or even have the same sign for all 
sub-samples.  The old and in all three sub-samples are more likely to feel they belong. 
                                                 
12 For example, one of the July 7 London bombers (British-born but whose parents were from Pakistan) 
appeared in a video and said “your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities 
against my people and your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly 
responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters”, with the use of the words ‘your’ 
and ‘my’ clearly expressing the people with whom he identified. 
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Turning to differences across sub-samples, whites with a strong ethnic identity are 
much more likely to feel they belong.  There is some evidence that those in areas with 
more non-whites are less likely to feel they belong.  Turning to the non-white sub-
samples, the Black, Chinese and other ethnic groups are less likely to report a sense of 
belonging than the South Asian, though the coefficients are only significant for 
BELONGBRIT.  A stronger sense of ethnic identity raises the sense of belonging for the 
immigrants but reduces it for the British-born.  All non-whites are less likely to report a 
sense of belonging if they live in wards with many other non-whites though these 
coefficients are often not significantly different from zero.  Religion and religiosity do 
not seem to be important.  More recent immigrants are much less likely to report that they 
feel they belong.  
Table 6 turns to consider the factors associated with feeling that one belongs to 
the neighbourhood and local area.  The responses to these questions are similar so we 
discuss them jointly.  The extent of own pro-sociality and the degree of pro-sociality in 
the neighbourhood are very strongly associated with feeling that one belongs to the 
neighbourhood.  Pro-social individuals are much more likely to feel they belong though 
the causality may well be that they contribute to the community because they feel they 
belong.  Those with a strong sense of ethnic identity are more likely to feel they belong as 
are those who feel they are treated with respect and that there is not much discrimination 
in general.   
In terms of differences between sub-samples, whites in high minority areas are 
significantly less likely to report that they feel they belong, as are the educated and the 
irreligious.  Women and the rich are significantly more likely to report a feeling that they 
belong.  For the non-white sub-samples, the Chinese and, to a less extent, the Black 
groups are less likely to report that they feel they belong, as are those who live in areas 
with fewer of their ethnic group.  Those without a religion seem significantly less likely 
to feel they belong to the neighbourhood or area.  There is some indication that non-white 
non-Christians are less likely to feel they belong to their local area (though not the local 
neighbourhood) and that this effect is stronger for the UK-born than for immigrants.     
A number of general conclusions emerge from this.  First, that you have to treat 
people well if you want them to feel they belong and identify with a group, whether that 
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group is a nation or a neighbourhood.  This is by far the strongest effect.  Secondly, 
having a minority ethnicity and religion is not strongly associated with a sense of 
belonging.  Thirdly, living in an area with people like you does seem to have an effect, 
albeit quite weak, on whether one feels one belongs.  And one striking feature is that the 
fitted values for representative individuals are similar for all sub-samples suggesting that 
the degree of belonging and British identity is very similar for whites and non-whites, 
foreign- and British-born. 
It is instructive to compare the factors that are strongly associated with a sense of 
belonging to the neighbourhood or area (reported in Table 6) with those strongly 
associated with a sense of belonging to Britain (reported in Table 5).  In general the 
factors are very similar – this is particularly true of the impact of the discrimination and 
respect variables – one interpretation of this is that many people’s experience of a country 
is heavily influenced by their local neighbourhood.  But there are also differences that are 
interesting.  Perceptions of discrimination by public institutions (GOVDISCRIM) reduce 
the sense of belonging to Britain but do not affect belonging to the neighbourhood.  And 
the pro-sociality of the neighbourhood (NEIGHPROSOC) affects belonging to the 
neighbourhood but not to Britain as a whole.      
Ss discussed earlier in the paper, the differences in the outcomes we have 
considered so far are a product both of individual preferences that influence whether 
people do not want to belong and the behavior of others which influences whether people 
can belong or how they are treated if they do.  It is hard to disentangle which results 
come from which of these two routes.  To try to get some idea of which of these aspects 
are important we turn to an analysis of some questions that relate to perceptions about 
whether national and religious/cultural identities are in conflict.  The results for these 
variables are reported in Table 7. 
The first variable, DUALID, is the response to the question of whether one thinks 
one can belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural and religious identity.  The 
question is phrased in a somewhat unfortunate way as it seems to imply that there is a 
clear ‘British’ cultural and religious identity but we suspect the respondents understand 
what is intended by the question – whether non-whites and non-Christians can be a part 
of Britain.  A striking fact is that the average value of the response for the representative 
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individual is only slightly lower for whites than non-whites in spite of the fact that the 
raw differences in means reported in Table 2 are quite different.  The reason is that the 
old white British are much more likely to perceive a conflict than the young. 
In all three sub-samples those who feel they are treated with respect are 
significantly more likely to believe that diversity is possible.  For both UK-born groups, 
perception of discrimination is associated with being less likely to believe that diversity is 
possible.  Non-Christians and those non-whites with a strong sense of ethnic identity are 
all more likely to believe it is possible.  Whites who mix more and live in more diverse 
neighbourhoods are more likely to think it is possible. More generally, ethnic and 
religious minorities think it is possible to belong to Britain and to preserve their heritage.   
The last three columns of Table 7 ask about whether the respondent generally has 
ever felt any conflict between national identity and religion.  Again, the fitted values for 
the reference individuals are similar for all three sub-samples.  Those who feel they are 
treated with respect are less likely to have felt such a conflict, as are those who live in 
pro-social neighbourhoods.  Non-whites living in areas with more people like them are 
more likely to perceive a conflict.  Women and the old are less likely to perceive a 
conflict. 
It is worth noting that non-Christians are more likely to have felt such a conflict.  
For the immigrant sub-sample the coefficients are of a similar size for all non-Christian 
groups and are generally significantly different from zero.  For the non-white UK-born 
only the coefficient for Muslims remains significantly different from zero although all the 
coefficients on other religions are also positive.  It is also worth noting that the more 
religious are more likely to have felt a conflict between national identity and religion.  
We would argue that this does suggest that the norms of behavior for having a British 
identity and the non-Christian religious identities are not the same so that there is 
sometimes a conflict between the two.  This is line with the model presented earlier, but 
the results in columns (2) and (3) of Table 7 suggest that these differences are not so 
large that non-Christians feel it is impossible to belong to Britain while maintaining a 
separate religious and cultural identity.    
These results do suggest some systematic difference in opinion between whites 
and non-whites about what is needed to belong to Britain.  It may be that airing of these 
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differences leads views to converge over time, or that differences persist and remain a 
potential source of conflict. 
  
Summary 
We think that the most striking result from these regressions is that people need to 
feel they are treated fairly and with respect if they are to feel that they belong.  Although 
the data comes from Britain, we feel this is likely to be a general conclusion.  Minorities, 
whether ethnic or religious, do not perceive any inevitable conflict between feeling 
British and maintaining their cultural heritage though do sometimes feel a conflict 
between national and religious identity.  There is some evidence that people are more 
likely to feel they belong when surrounded by people like them but the effect is not very 
large. 
We have documented the sense of belonging and identity but have said nothing 
about what is required of the individual for them to say they belong i.e. what behaviors 
and attitudes are needed to be able to say you identify with Britain.  There are those who 
believe that because Britain has asked too little from immigrants, that it has made it too 
easy for them to feel that they belong.  This relates to a more academic debate about what 
should be contained in ‘nation-building’ programmes designed to create a common sense 
of national identity.  For some a ‘thin’ conception based on a common language and 
acceptance of political institutions are enough, for others something deeper is needed.  
For example, Barry (2001, p83) states that “the problem is that the criteria for 
membership in the British nation may be so undemanding as to render membership 
incapable of providing the foundation of common identity that is needed for the stability 
and justice of liberal democratic polities” and that “British seems to be largely a legal 
conception tied up with formal British citizenship rather than one with significant 
affective cognitive or behavioral connotations”.  In terms of the conceptual framework 
sketched in this paper, this can be thought of as an argument that Britain has become too 
tolerant, that gb  has become so low, that ‘British’ identity has no consequences for 
behavior.  Note that in (2) and (3), 0gb   will imply that individuals identify with the 
group but that it has no consequences for behavior, which is set at the individual 
optimum.  A companion paper (Georgiadis and Manning, 2009) analyzes the Citizenship 
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Survey to investigate differences in values across groups within British society more 
directly, concluding that there are few large differences in practice.   
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we have sought to understand the determinants of national identity.  We 
presented a simple conceptual framework based on the work of Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000) and used this to develop predictions about the correlations between various 
measures of identity and variables that measure the experiences, interactions, and 
integration that commentators have argued to be important determinants of identity.  We 
then investigated which of these correlations are important in practice though the nature 
of the data is such that we cannot prove these are causal effects.  However, we believe 
our analysis is worthwhile because this is an area where there are strongly-held views 
often based on no evidence whatsoever.     
 Our main finding that people who feel well treated and tolerated are more likely 
to feel they belong or identify with the society.  People who are surrounded by people 
like themselves are more likely to feel they belong.  That might suggest that putting 
pressure on minorities to conform or live in mixed communities might not be successful 
in generating a sense of belonging.  Religious minorities are more likely to report 
experiencing a conflict between national identity and religion, but these groups also do 
not perceive any irresolvable conflicts in this area.  However the white British do 
perceive a larger amount of conflict so that there is a gap between what minorities think 
and what the white British population think minorities think.  Such lack of mutual 
understanding is quite possibly, a potent source of conflict and a justification for 
descriptive analysis like the one we have undertaken.   
Our empirical results relate to England and Wales so it is worthwhile considering 
whether our conclusions are likely to be of wider applicability.  While there are some 
characteristics of the UK that are distinctive e.g. the geographical background of the 
immigrant groups, the general conclusion that people feel they belong if they feel they 
are treated well is likely to be a general one though only research on other countries could 
confirm this. 
 29 
In terms of future research, we would emphasize that the limitations of our 
research design mean that our conclusions must necessarily be tentative.  The correlations 
we have found and the interpretations we have given them need to have a more robust 
evidence base.  We also need similar studies of other countries to discover whether the 
findings here are unique to the UK or more generally applicable.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Demographics 
 
Variable  White British Non-white Immigrants Non-white British-born 
Age 47.65 41 30.3 
Female  0.52 0.47 0.51 
Married/cohabiting 0.65 0.64 0.38 
Education 3.03 3.13 3.56 
Ethnicity    
White 1 0 0 
Mixed  0 0.04 0.15 
Indian 0 0.26 0.24 
Pakistani 0 0.13 0.2 
Bangladeshi 0 0.068 0.047 
Black Caribbean 0 0.08 0.18 
Black African  0 0.17 0.06 
Chinese 0 0.04 0.03 
Other ethnicity 0 0.18 0.08 
Religion    
Christian 0.8 0.32 0.36 
Buddhist 0.002 0.03 0.006 
Hindu  0.0003 0.17 0.1 
Jewish 0.004 0.001 0.0005 
Muslim 0.001 0.34 0.31 
Sikh 0 0.05 0.08 
Other religion 0.02 0.02 0.03 
No religion 0.17 0.05 0.1 
Sample size (unweighted) 7842 3935 1596 
Unweighted proportion 0.58 0.29 0.12 
Weighted proportion 0.91 0.058 0.026 
 
Notes: Descriptive statistics are computed using individual sampling weights.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Identity Variables 
 
Variable  White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
Dependent variables     
BRITID: Whether reports British national identity    
1: yes 0.99 0.58 0.95 
0: no 0.01 0.42 0.05 
Mean  0.99 0.58 0.95 
FEELBRIT: Extent to which feels a part of British Society     
1:strongly agree 0.54 0.46 0.43 
0.66: tend to agree 0.39 0.45 0.52 
0.33: tend to disagree 0.05 0.06 0.04 
0: strongly disagree 0.02 0.03 0.01 
Mean 0.81 0.78 0.78 
BELONGBRIT: Strength of feeling of belonging to Britain    
1:very strongly 0.46 0.44 0.35 
0.66: fairly strongly 0.38 0.42 0.5 
0.33: not very strongly 0.13 0.12 0.12 
0: not at all strongly 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Mean 0.76 0.75 0.72 
BELONGNEIGH: Strength of feeling of belonging to immediate 
neighborhood 
   
1:very strongly 0.35 0.34 0.33 
0.66: fairly strongly 0.41 0.43 0.43 
0.33: not very strongly 0.19 0.17 0.20 
0: not at all strongly 0.05 0.06 0.04 
Mean 0.68 0.68 0.68 
BELONGLOC: Strength of feeling of belonging to local area    
1:very strongly 0.27 0.26 0.28 
0.66: fairly strongly 0.45 0.47 0.46 
0.33: not very strongly 0.22 0.21 0.21 
0: not at all strongly 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Mean 0.64 0.64 0.65 
DUALID: Extent to which agrees that one can belong to Britain and 
maintain a separate cultural and religious identity 
   
1:strongly agree 0.16 0.37 0.33 
0.66: tend to agree 0.5 0.46 0.49 
0.33: tend to disagree 0.23 0.11 0.14 
0: strongly disagree 0.11 0.05 0.04 
Mean 0.57 0.72 0.7 
FECONF: Extent to which feels a conflict between national identity and 
religion 
   
1: all of the time 0.01 0.03 0.01 
0.75: most of the time 0.03 0.06 0.08 
0.5: some of the time 0.13 0.14 0.27 
0.25: rarely 0.2 0.19 0.24 
0: never 0.63 0.58 0.4 
Mean 0.14 0.19 0.27 
 
Notes: Descriptive statistics are weighted proportions and averages computed using individual sampling weights.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables 
 
Variable  White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
IMPETH: Importance of ethnic background to your sense of who you are 0.63 0.8 0.8 
IMPFO: Importance of family’s origin to your sense of who you are  0.68 0.78 0.7 
IMPORTREL: Importance of religion 0.24 0.47 0.4 
ELANG: English Proficiency 1.99 1.44 1.9 
PETHWARD: Decile of the proportion of non-whites in the ward  5 9 8.8 
ETHAREA: Perception of  the proportion of people of the same ethnicity 
in the local area 
0.32 0.81 0.78 
MIXING:  Mixing with people from different ethnic and religious groups  0.34 0.57 0.64 
GOVDISCRIM:  Discrimination by government organizations 1.96 2.07 2.16 
RESPECT: Extent individual feels is treated with respect 0.8 0.81 0.8 
GENDISCRIM: Discrimination in society 1.83 1.7 1.85 
INCOME: Economic situation 2.43 1.88 1.91 
NEIGHPROSOC: Neighbours prosociality 2.34 2.3 2.15 
PROSOCIAL: Own prosociality 0.11 0.08 0.1 
 
Notes: Descriptive statistics are weighted averages computed using individual sampling weights. Higher values are 
associated with (stronger) support of relevant statements/questions; see the Appendix for a detailed variable coding. 
IMPORTREL, ELANG, MIXING, GOVDISCRIM, RESPECT, GENDISCR, INCOME, NEIGHPROSOC and 
PROSOCIAL are summated scales defined in the Appendix (see tables A.2-A.10).  
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Table 4:  Results for British Identity 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable  Belonging to Britain 
Independent variables Non-white Immigrants Non-white British-born 
Age 0.0290** -0.00517 
 (0.00923) (0.00457) 
Female -0.00168 0.00443 
 (0.0203) (0.00835) 
Mixed ethnicity -0.178*** 0.00847 
 (0.0531) (0.0200) 
Pakistani 0.0591 0.0137 
 (0.0418) (0.0130) 
Bangladeshi 0.0774 0.00400 
 (0.0505) (0.0201) 
Black Caribbean 0.0798 0.0144 
 (0.0462) (0.0200) 
Black African -0.105* -0.0234 
 (0.0417) (0.0409) 
Chinese -0.164* -0.0773 
 (0.0665) (0.0884) 
Other ethnicity -0.144*** -0.0125 
 (0.0366) (0.0306) 
IMPETH -0.0267 -0.0402* 
 (0.0444) (0.0204) 
IMPFO -0.137** -0.0172 
 (0.0433) (0.0170) 
non-Christian   
   
Hindu 0.0661 -0.0304 
 (0.0376) (0.0442) 
Muslim 0.104*** -0.0339 
 (0.0316) (0.0311) 
Sikh -0.0309 -0.0207 
 (0.0560) (0.0409) 
Other religion -0.0148 -0.0438 
 (0.0510) (0.0483) 
No religion -0.0320 -0.0555 
 (0.0549) (0.0316) 
IMPORTREL 0.0654 -0.0425* 
 (0.0439) (0.0185) 
ELANG 0.106***  
 (0.0190)  
PETHWARD -0.00398 0.00655* 
 (0.00926) (0.00293) 
ETHAREA -0.0926* -0.0261 
 (0.0384) (0.0139) 
MIXING -0.0157 0.0186 
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 (0.0515) (0.0224) 
GOVDISCRIM -0.0308 -0.0193 
 (0.0488) (0.0185) 
RESPECT 0.0467 -0.00785 
 (0.0736) (0.0311) 
GENDISCRIM 0.0256 0.0109 
 (0.0243) (0.00957) 
Education -0.00455 0.00350 
 (0.00494) (0.00233) 
INCOME 0.0412* 0.00696 
 (0.0168) (0.00710) 
NEIGHPROSOC -0.0131 0.00228 
 (0.0200) (0.00846) 
PROSOCIAL -0.0255 -0.0148 
 (0.146) (0.0647) 
came to UK in the last 5 
years    -0.534***  
 (0.0218)  
came to UK 6/7 years 
ago   -0.295***  
 (0.0324)  
R-squared 0.266 0.098 
Observations 3170 1365 
Fitted value for reference 
individual 
0.75    0.96 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Regional dummies were also 
included in all specifications IMPORTREL, ELANG, MIXING, GOVDISCRIM, RESPECT, GENDISCR, INCOME, 
NEIGHPROSOC and PROSOCIAL are summated scales defined in the Appendix (see tables A.2-A.10).  Fitted values 
for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables across the three 
subsamples  (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to the sample mean 
value for  categorical variables) with religion set to “Christian” and ethnicity for non-whites being “Indian”. 
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Table 5:  Results for Sense of Belonging to Britain 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable  
Feeling part of Britain Belonging to Britain 
Independent 
variables 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
Age 0.005** 0.017*** 0.004 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.013 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
Female 0.007 -0.018** 0.007 -0.003 -0.010 0.027** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) 
Mixed ethnicity  -0.035 0.001  -0.076*** -0.043 
  (0.023) (0.025)  (0.024) (0.032) 
Pakistani  0.003 -0.002  -0.023 -0.001 
  (0.017) (0.023)  (0.018) (0.029) 
Bangladeshi  0.019 -0.004  0.015 -0.056 
  (0.021) (0.035)  (0.022) (0.042) 
Black Caribbean  -0.036 -0.036  -0.066*** -0.087*** 
  (0.020) (0.025)  (0.021) (0.032) 
Black African  -0.011 -0.034  -0.027 -0.090** 
  (0.017) (0.031)  (0.018) (0.041) 
Chinese  -0.069** -0.039  -0.136*** -0.080 
  (0.031) (0.043)  (0.032) (0.047) 
Other ethnicity  -0.013 -0.035  -0.039** -0.131*** 
  (0.014) (0.028)  (0.015) (0.036) 
IMPETH 0.052*** 0.014 -0.050** 0.095*** 0.031 -0.045 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.024) (0.012) (0.019) (0.028) 
IMPFO  0.028 -0.007  -0.024 0.014 
  (0.017) (0.021)  (0.017) (0.024) 
non-Christian -0.037   -0.039   
 (0.020)   (0.022)   
Hindu  0.010 -0.018  -0.012 -0.045 
  (0.016) (0.027)  (0.017) (0.033) 
Muslim  0.0001 0.001  0.008 -0.013 
  (0.014) (0.024)  (0.014) (0.031) 
Sikh  -0.016 -0.014  -0.016 -0.010 
  (0.022) (0.027)  (0.022) (0.034) 
Other religion  -0.040 -0.078**  -0.043** 0.016 
  (0.022) (0.034)  (0.021) (0.034) 
No religion -0.019** -0.028 -0.010 -0.023** -0.069*** -0.021 
 (0.008) (0.025) (0.020) (0.010) (0.026) (0.025) 
IMPORTREL 0.006 -0.031 -0.016 0.025 -0.039** -0.010 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.025) (0.016) (0.019) (0.029) 
ELANG  0.033***   0.037***  
  (0.008)   (0.008)  
PETHWARD -0.003** -0.006 -0.007 -0.001 -0.003 -0.012** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
ETHAREA 0.012 -0.008 0.042** 0.003 -0.026 0.049** 
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 (0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) 
MIXING 0.022 0.021 0.060** -0.012 0.028 0.074 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.030) (0.018) (0.022) (0.038) 
GOVDISCRIM -0.121*** -0.094*** -0.176*** -0.132*** -0.158*** -0.244*** 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.026) (0.017) (0.024) (0.030) 
RESPECT 0.241*** 0.178*** 0.208*** 0.274*** 0.131*** 0.235*** 
 (0.025) (0.032) (0.043) (0.028) (0.032) (0.052) 
GENDISCRIM -0.071*** -0.075*** -0.068*** -0.079*** -0.077*** -0.073*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) 
Education 0.005*** -0.001 0.004 0.007*** -0.008*** -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
INCOME 0.002 -0.006 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.024** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) 
NEIGHPROSOC 0.008 -0.002 0.018 0.019** -0.006 0.028** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) 
PROSOCIAL 0.121*** 0.150** 0.074 0.016 0.059 -0.055 
 (0.037) (0.060) (0.075) (0.044) (0.067) (0.086) 
Came to UK in 
the last 5 years     -0.094***   -0.109***  
  (0.012)   (0.013)  
Came to UK 6/7 
years ago    -0.045***   -0.063***  
  (0.015)   (0.016)  
R-squared 0.089 0.129 0.150 0.103 0.170 0.172 
Observations 5666 3124 1478 5681 3152 1474 
Fitted value for 
reference 
individual 
0.84 0.82 0.86 0.75 0.82 0.88 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Regional dummies were also 
included in all specifications. IMPORTREL, ELANG, MIXING, GOVDISCRIM, RESPECT, GENDISCR, INCOME, 
NEIGHPROSOC and PROSOCIAL are summated scales defined in the Appendix (see tables A.2-A.10). Fitted values 
for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables across the three 
subsamples  (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to the sample mean 
value for  categorical variables) with religion set to “Christian” and ethnicity for non-whites being “Indian”. 
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Table 6:  Results for Sense of Belonging to Neighborhood and Local Area 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable  
Belonging to neighborhood Belonging to local area 
Independent 
variables 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
Age 0.021*** 0.016*** -0.006 0.012*** 0.016*** -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) 
Female 0.023*** -0.009 -0.040*** 0.019*** -0.008 -0.021 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) 
Mixed ethnicity  -0.040 0.007  -0.039 -0.003 
  (0.027) (0.037)  (0.027) (0.037) 
Pakistani  0.014 0.045  0.014 0.022 
  (0.020) (0.031)  (0.019) (0.032) 
Bangladeshi  0.027 0.015  0.010 0.053 
  (0.023) (0.049)  (0.024) (0.047) 
Black Caribbean  -0.024 0.008  -0.023 -0.048 
  (0.025) (0.037)  (0.024) (0.037) 
Black African  -0.037 -0.035  -0.042** -0.049 
  (0.021) (0.048)  (0.021) (0.048) 
Chinese  -0.099*** -0.149***  -0.102*** -0.099 
  (0.034) (0.055)  (0.033) (0.053) 
Other ethnicity  -0.033 0.009  -0.033 0.003 
  (0.018) (0.041)  (0.017) (0.038) 
IMPETH 0.056*** 0.043 0.024 0.044*** 0.031 0.013 
 (0.013) (0.022) (0.033) (0.013) (0.021) (0.033) 
IMPFO  
 
0.041 
(0.022) 
0.047 
(0.028) 
 
 
0.039 
(0.020) 
0.038 
(0.028)  
non-Christian -0.031 
(0.023) 
 
 
 
 
-0.004 
(0.023) 
 
 
 
  
Hindu  0.001 -0.027  -0.006 -0.096** 
  (0.020) (0.042)  (0.020) (0.041) 
Muslim  -0.005 -0.021  0.016 -0.052 
  (0.018) (0.034)  (0.017) (0.033) 
Sikh  -0.028 -0.038  -0.004 -0.091** 
  (0.026) (0.042)  (0.026) (0.042) 
Other religion  0.003 -0.007  0.057** 0.025 
  (0.024) (0.040)  (0.023) (0.034) 
No religion -0.036*** -0.034 -0.063** 0.001 -0.015 -0.079*** 
 (0.011) (0.029) (0.030) (0.010) (0.028) (0.028) 
IMPORTREL 0.031 0.037 0.003 0.044** 0.027 0.008 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.033) (0.018) (0.022) (0.033) 
ELANG  -0.001   0.013  
  (0.009)   (0.009)  
PETHWARD -0.005*** -0.010** 0.005 -0.007*** -0.008 0.006 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) 
ETHAREA -0.0001 -0.058*** -0.051 -0.012 -0.068*** -0.063** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.027) (0.017) (0.018) (0.027) 
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MIXING 0.017 0.049 -0.034 0.023 0.049 0.047 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.042) (0.019) (0.025) (0.041) 
GOVDISCRIM 0.004 -0.056** 0.001 0.001 -0.041 0.013 
 (0.017) (0.026) (0.032) (0.017) (0.026) (0.032) 
RESPECT 0.234*** 0.172*** 0.263*** 0.237*** 0.210*** 0.283*** 
 (0.029) (0.038) (0.058) (0.029) (0.036) (0.056) 
GENDISCRIM -0.089*** -0.113*** -0.121*** -0.108*** -0.101*** -0.139*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.021) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) 
Education -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.003 -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
INCOME 0.012** 0.001 -0.006 0.009 -0.011 -0.022 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) 
NEIGHPROSOC 0.044*** 0.033*** 0.025 0.031*** 0.022** 0.019 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) 
PROSOCIAL 0.355*** 0.274*** 0.271*** 0.271*** 0.245*** 0.058 
 (0.048) (0.074) (0.089) (0.049) (0.071) (0.098) 
Came to UK in 
the last 5 years     -0.109***   -0.072***  
  (0.014)   (0.014)  
Came to UK 6/7 
years ago    -0.059***   -0.064***  
  (0.019)   (0.019)  
R-squared 0.115 0.144 0.110 0.096 0.126 0.117 
Observations 5682 3155 1476 5684 3158 1480 
Fitted value for 
reference 
individual 
0.7 0.72 0.65 0.64 0.68 0.66 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Regional dummies were also 
included in all specifications. IMPORTREL, ELANG, MIXING, GOVDISCRIM, RESPECT, GENDISCR, INCOME, 
NEIGHPROSOC and PROSOCIAL are summated scales defined in the Appendix (see tables A.2-A.10). Fitted values 
for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables across the three 
subsamples  (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to the sample mean 
value for  categorical variables) with religion set to “Christian” and ethnicity for non-whites being “Indian”. 
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Table 7:  Results for Views about conflict between National and Religious/Cultural Identity  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable  
Belonging to Britain and maintain a separate 
cultural and religious identity 
Conflict between national identity and 
religion 
Independent 
variables 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
Age -0.012*** 0.002 0.010 -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.017 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) 
Female 0.007 -0.011 -0.002 -0.034*** -0.029** -0.025 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) 
Mixed ethnicity  -0.021 0.009  0.033 0.029 
  (0.029) (0.036)  (0.035) (0.046) 
Pakistani  0.017 -0.006  -0.006 0.007 
  (0.021) (0.031)  (0.024) (0.036) 
Bangladeshi  -0.042 0.019  -0.065** -0.009 
  (0.028) (0.044)  (0.029) (0.054) 
Black Caribbean  -0.018 0.035  0.025 0.029 
  (0.026) (0.037)  (0.028) (0.049) 
Black African  0.019 0.061  0.001 -0.008 
  (0.022) (0.043)  (0.024) (0.055) 
Chinese  0.060 0.016  0.007 0.120 
  (0.032) (0.057)  (0.042) (0.086) 
Other ethnicity  -0.010 0.008  0.032 -0.021 
  (0.019) (0.039)  (0.021) (0.049) 
IMPETH -0.023 0.074*** 0.052 -0.016 -0.011 0.075 
 (0.014) (0.024) (0.031) (0.021) (0.030) (0.048) 
IMPFO  
 
0.015 
(0.021) 
0.012 
(0.027) 
 
 
0.028 
(0.025) 
-0.013 
(0.040)  
non-Christian 0.066*** 
(0.022) 
 
 
 
 
0.031 
(0.028) 
 
 
 
  
Hindu  0.087*** 0.078**  0.048** 0.064 
  (0.021) (0.040)  (0.023) (0.049) 
Muslim  0.088*** 0.111***  0.099*** 0.091** 
  (0.017) (0.032)  (0.020) (0.041) 
Sikh  0.060** 0.096**  0.109*** 0.045 
  (0.029) (0.040)  (0.031) (0.048) 
Other religion  0.033 0.056  0.085*** 0.054 
  (0.024) (0.041)  (0.032) (0.051) 
No religion 0.018 -0.004 0.031 0.024 0.156** -0.030 
 (0.011) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.076) (0.063) 
IMPORTREL 0.024 0.003 0.024 0.152*** 0.124*** 0.142*** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.032) (0.024) (0.028) (0.043) 
ELANG  -0.001   -0.003  
  (0.009)   (0.011)  
PETHWARD 0.003 0.004 0.006 -0.001 0.001 -0.012 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) 
ETHAREA 0.023 0.015 0.044 0.006 -0.073*** -0.098*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0.023) (0.024) (0.033) 
 40 
MIXING 0.103*** -0.006 0.062 0.047 0.019 0.110** 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.040) (0.025) (0.030) (0.051) 
GOVDISCRIM -0.144*** 0.022 -0.077** 0.002 0.022 0.117*** 
 (0.018) (0.027) (0.032) (0.024) (0.033) (0.042) 
RESPECT 0.139*** 0.118*** 0.097 -0.200*** -0.149*** -0.165** 
 (0.030) (0.038) (0.053) (0.040) (0.044) (0.072) 
GENDISCRIM -0.081*** 0.011 -0.054*** 0.009 0.025 0.040 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.024) 
Education 0.009*** -0.001 0.003 -0.013*** -0.002 -0.009 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
INCOME -0.010 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 0.007 -0.0001 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) 
NEIGHPROSOC 0.0001 0.001 -0.001 -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.048** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) 
PROSOCIAL -0.001 0.147** 0.102 0.025 0.078 0.096 
 (0.050) (0.071) (0.084) (0.063) (0.084) (0.113) 
came to UK in the 
last 5 years     0.005   -0.038**  
  (0.013)   (0.016)  
came to UK 6/7 
years ago    0.004   0.0001  
  (0.019)   (0.021)  
R-squared 0.076 0.043 0.058 0.092 0.087 0.134 
Observations 5463 3033 1444 2174 2392 948 
Fitted value for 
reference 
individual 
 0.59  0.63  0.63  0.12  0.09 0.11 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Regional dummies were also 
included in all specifications. The sample size is relatively smaller for specifications (4), (5) and (6) because the 
relevant question was asked only to those who responded to preceding questions that both national identity and religion 
are important for them. IMPORTREL, ELANG, MIXING, GOVDISCRIM, RESPECT, GENDISCR, INCOME, 
NEIGHPROSOC and PROSOCIAL are summated scales defined in the Appendix (see tables A.2-A.10). Fitted values 
for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables across the three 
subsamples  (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to the sample mean 
value for  categorical variables) with religion set to “Christian” and ethnicity for non-whites being “Indian”. 
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